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For decades, swarms in nature, like locust swarms, have intrigued scientists and inspired them
to uncover their fundamental laws. Swarms represent the ability to use the simple and many to
accomplish the large and complex.
Now imagine being able to deploy a collection of drones on the scale and magnitude of a
locust swarm. Indeed, the same laws that govern natural swarms could govern collective
masses of cheap robotic systems. Today, efforts are underway to develop commercial
swarms for crop pollination, surveillance, and high-resolution weather monitoring.
However, to date, developers largely centralize the management of their robotic swarms .
Although this may work well in certain commercial applications, it may not necessarily work
for military operations. Decentralized swarms are more resilient, given that centralized
execution presents a single point of vulnerability that could be problematic in the contested
environments of near-peer adversaries.
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As two Air Force officers, we wonder, “is our service prepared to unleash the swarm?” We
recently watched an official Air Force video of a hypothetical scenario, in which an F-35,
teamed with a group of drones, launched on a mission to strike a strategic target deep inside
the contested environment of a near-peer adversary. We wondered what would happen if
dynamic threats emerged, forcing a departure from the pre-planned flight path, requiring the
pilot to micromanage the decisions of each drone in an effort to salvage the strike. In such a
case, the speed, scope, and complexity of the situation would overwhelm the pilot and the
strike would fail. Although the F-35 had a capable team of drones, the key lesson was that a
high number of drones alone does not equal a swarm.
For the Air Force, merely fielding a large group of drones in combat will not be decisive; the
service must first figure out how to decentralize the drones’ execution and rebalance the
workload of the human-autonomy teams. As a recent report by the Marine Corps Warfighting
Lab shows, responsively controlling individual decisions of large numbers of drones is beyond
the cognitive capabilities of a human. Instead, each drone must be able to execute the
fundamental characteristic of the entire swarm, which is to independently coordinate its own
decisions to produce behaviors to support a collective aim. Therefore, to effectively employ
drones as a swarm, the human must delegate more freedom of action to the collective
decision-making algorithms of their autonomous systems.
In this article, we extend the framework put forth by a recent War on the Rocks article
describing “Athena,” a wargaming platform that tests artificial intelligence capabilities and
captures and assesses the resulting data to improve military training. We argue that AI and
wargames can be used to train not just human beings, but also drones. Specifically, by using
narrow AI to play through millions of iterations of a mission-specific wargame, this framework
uncovers the best rules for individual drone interaction that drive collective swarm behaviors
supporting a specific mission.  This “way of swarm” provides a method that is rapid in
execution, highly flexible and adaptive to changing assumptions, and can focus on a specific
mission while helping individual drones operate in decentralized fashion in service of a
collective mission.
The Athena Approach
In their article on Athena, Benjamin Jensen, Scott Cuomo, and Chris Whyte contend that,
instead of waiting for revolutions in general AI that will offer the flexibility and broad cognitive
ability of humans, a focus on achievements in narrow AI, which is good at performing only
specific tasks, offers a more immediate opportunity to solve specific military problems.
The authors write:
Wargames provide the optimal platform for exploring how to integrate AI with [commanders’]
operational judgment. … Our wargame, Athena, offers a way to build up a repository of data for
future testing, enhance understanding of how AI can assist with training, red-teaming, and
simulation, and highlight the limits of these capabilities as they interact with humans in uncertain
environments.
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We concur that the Athena framework of combining traditional wargaming with narrow AI can
improve the quality of human training by reinforcing a commanders’ operational and tactical
decision-making process. Moreover, this framework can be applied to training drones. Narrow
artificial intelligence, incorporated into wargaming platforms, presents a way to rapidly train
quality decision-making algorithms to meet the Air Force’s growing demand for swarming
drones and loyal wingmen.
A training program for drone swarm algorithms that is rapid, flexible, and mission-specific will
become paramount as the character of warfare changes. The confluence of commercially
available technologies, like AI and drones, is progressing warfare into its next predicted
evolution, where any force can now deploy a swarm into combat. Given the rise of long-term
strategic competition between nations as well as their deliberate investment in AI and
autonomy, figuring out how to not only leverage swarms, but also how to defend against them,
is critical for a competitive strategy.
Insight from the Study of War
“Quantity has a quality of its own.” – Attributed to Joseph Stalin
In a campaign for air dominance, a disadvantage in quantity can render the quality of the force
irrelevant. In World War II, Russian forces blunted the German Air Force on the Eastern Front
with sheer numbers. The same applied in the Pacific with the Japanese Air Force : While
initially exceptionally well-trained, Japanese pilots quickly became too hard to replace in the
quantities required to effectively compete. However, when two hypothetical forces are
operating swarms of roughly similar sizes (as futurists anticipate), quality comes back into the
picture. Simply possessing the same number of drones will no longer be decisive.
Furthermore, in present-day swarms, each additional drone requires an increase in the
workload of human controllers, eventually reaching a point of diminishing return for fielding a
higher-quantity swarm. In these cases, success will come down to the quality — not the
quantity — of the swarms employed.
Yet, what does quality mean in this context? Throughout history, it has often been not the
hardware that was decisive in combat, but how well the human was trained to operate the
technology (i.e., Flying Tigers, Sedan in 1940, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Falklands War). Studies on
military training have found that the human was usually the limiting factor in the combat
effectiveness of a weapon system, leading to a revolution in training programs across the
services. During the Vietnam War, the Navy implemented Top Gun, a rigorous training program
for their pilots that contributed to increasing the air-to-air kill ratio from two-to-one to twelve-
to-one. After Vietnam, both the Air Force and Army learned from the Navy’s success, and
established large force exercises, like Red Flag and the National Training Center, to provide
their operators with additional rigorous training cycles.
Besides just looking at how soldiers trained, the military began to focus on optimizing human
decision-making processes. The Air Force trained aircrews to implement Colonel John Boyd’s
seminal model to speed the decision-making process by using a feedback loop of observing
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the environment, orienting possible solutions, deciding based on the limited information, and
acting to achieve a desired effect (the OODA loop).
“Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their
ingenuity.” – General George S. Patton, Jr.
The large force training exercises also helped the services enhance their doctrine of
centralized control and decentralized execution . This concept became one of the fundamental
tenets of the Air Force “way of war”  as the scale, scope, and complexity of combat increased.
The services now use the term mission command to embody the importance of decentralized
execution in war.
Rigorous training, faster decision-making, and decentralized execution will continue to be
critical when dealing with swarms of autonomous systems. Researchers contend that the
decisive factor in the quality of autonomous systems will be the OODA loop-like algorithms
inside the hardware that act either independently or in tandem with the human. But those
algorithms need to be trained in order for the hardware to know what to do. In short, training
humans will no longer be adequate; instead, training algorithms will become increasingly
critical.  Quality algorithms will enable more flexibility in the tactical environment and allow for
decentralized execution at an unprecedented scale. Hence the need for a strategic framework
that rapidly trains algorithms and builds trust and confidence between the human and the
autonomous system.
Strategic Framework
One promising framework under development for training swarms of autonomous systems is
DARPA’s Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) program. OFFSET proposes to use a
real-time game environment and a virtual reality interface to allow users to derive novel swarm
tactics for autonomous systems through “crowd-sourcing” methods. By using mission-specific
games to train, test, and employ swarming capabilities (rather than tailoring primitive
swarming behaviors to a mission), the OFFSET framework displays significant promise.
However, we foresee three weaknesses with OFFSET. First, relying on crowd-sourcing efforts
to experiment with the game may be difficult to sustain over time. The size of the “crowd” may
not be sustainable as interest (and funding) in the project ebbs and flows. Second, as different
hardware and environments become ready for testing, a crowd-sourcing method becomes
cumbersome to rapidly repeat in training. Third, OFFSET is too slow. It emphasizes a real-time
simulation environment for training swarms, where drones move via “point-and-click” through
the battlespace. This approach reduces the speed and initiative of swarms in operations and
makes it difficult to speed up repetitions to train drones through thousands of potential
tactical scenarios in minutes or seconds.
However, combining OFFSET’s existing framework with narrow AI can produce a novel
framework that is rapid, flexible, and adaptive to a variety of missions. In 2017, Google’s Deep
Mind surprised many when it applied a similar “self-play” training framework (i.e. reinforced
machine learning) to generate an algorithm that mastered the Chinese game of Go . Google’s
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narrow AI was able to accumulate thousands of years of human knowledge during a period of
just a few days, which was only possible through faster-than-real-time simulations. Combining
Google’s breakthrough in narrow AI with mission-specific wargames provides a powerful way
to train and fight with swarms of drones.
For example, narrow AI could play a wargame that simulates high-level decisions, actions,
interactions, and resulting behaviors for a swarm of aerial drones tasked to defend a base.
Instead of solving for a centralized solution to manage the placement of the entire defending
swarm, narrow AI iteratively discovers the best rules for individual interactions that, combined,
generate a collective swarm behavior that minimizes base damage from an attacking force.
Ultimately, the resulting “AI-trained” local interaction rules get loaded into each drone in a real-
world swarm, ready to perform the specific base defense mission. The optimized local drone
interaction rules enable self-organization and decentralization, which reduces human oversight
to perform the specific mission.
We argue that this proposed Air Force “way of swarm” addresses the weakness of current
drone training frameworks. First, it is rapid in execution and insulated from the instability of
crowd-sourcing. The workload demand of a human crowd is replaced by the persistent
availability of AI algorithms and cloud computing. Second, both the narrow AI and wargame
would be highly flexible and adaptive to changing assumptions of the game, such as new
hardware or environmental conditions. For instance, if a new sensor became available allowing
the drone to better detect the adversary, the framework could rapidly re-run to again master
the modified game. Third, this framework continues to apply the principle of using missions to
determine capabilities  rather than the other way around, but it does so by allowing the narrow
AI to solve local drone interaction rules that preserve the principles of decentralized execution.
Anticipated Challenges
Combining high-fidelity wargames and cutting-edge narrow AI requires integrating private
sector knowledge and military subject matter experts. Unfortunately, friction around this type
of partnership has already occurred with nearly 4,000 Google employees demanding an end to
their company’s support to the Defense Department over Project Maven. That project aimed to
use narrow AI to reduce the human workload and minimize non-combatant casualties, by
helping military analysts better process, exploit, and disseminate the vast amount of collected
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data.
Additionally, when using narrow AI there is a risk of the “black box” phenomenon. This occurs
when there is no simple explanation for the decision an algorithm makes due to the complexity
of the machine learning technique used. Ultimately, the military must strike a balance in how
much risk it assumes. The trade-off is between low human bias and more decision-making
flexibility, or high human bias that offers greater insight into why an algorithm made a
particular decision, which can increase trust and confidence.
“No war is over until the enemy says it’s over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in
fact, the enemy gets a vote.” – Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis
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Some have even argued that the swarm may be “dead on arrival.” First, these critics point out,
drones may not be as cheap as those advocating for the technology predict. But while we
acknowledge that weaponizing drones may be cost-prohibitive at this point, commercially
available systems like the DJI Mavic 2 (widely used by U.S. soldiers until a recent ban) are
cheap enough (approximately $1,000 each) to achieve a sufficient quantity to leverage the
benefits of a swarm in non-kinetic missions, given the right decision-making algorithms.
Second, swarm skeptics also claim that the same information technology that will enable
drone swarms will also enable an adversary to deploy a cheap and effective air defense to
defeat them. Although there is evidence to support this claim, history reminds us that even the
best air defenses aren’t always perfect.  For example, Stanley Baldwin’s proclamation in 1932
that “the bomber will always get through ” an air defense proved to be true during World War II
if the bomber’s force was willing to sustain high casualties. Swarms of cheap autonomous
systems, by nature, reduce the risk of sustaining high casualties. Therefore, with high enough
numbers, the swarm will always get through, despite how technologically advanced the air
defense is.
Finally, some opponents of computer-based wargames contend that these models will
produce an gap between theory and reality because they cannot capture human motivations
like desire, commitment, passion, or will. Although these critiques hold merit, it also depends
on the intended use of the wargame; the more specific (less generalizable) the wargame, the
more the model is representative. Moreover, validating wargames with additional methods,
such as field testing, can strengthen their utility for prediction and reduce the gap between
simulations and reality. In the case of field testing swarms, the data could feed back into the
AI and wargaming framework to generate more refined behaviors in subsequent operations.
A Way of Swarm
Many have recognized  the rising cost of military hardware and the corresponding decrease in
the quantity the services can field. The military has sought to reverse this trend by investing in
large quantities of cheap systems (like drone swarms), yet it has overlooked a crucial element:
how to train the swarm. To leverage the full potential of a swarm, the Air Force must build trust
within the human-autonomy team and train to decentralize swarm execution.
We argue that this Air Force “way of swarm” holds promise for training a mastered array of
tactics for its upcoming swarms of autonomous systems. Using narrow AI to play mission-
specific wargames provides a rapid, flexible, and adaptive way to discover the best local
interaction rules leading to useful collective swarm behaviors; this enhances human-autonomy
teams by taking the workload off the human. Without delegating more freedom of action to the
autonomous systems of a swarm, the speed, scope, and complexity of the future operating
environment will outpace human-autonomy teams.  Just as efforts to train quality aircrews
were strategically decisive in the past, in the future, training the best quality algorithms for the
Air Force’s drone swarms and teaming them with airmen will help the U.S. military maintain a
competitive military advantage.
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